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Abstract
In spite of their seemingly “obvious” virtues
as a search strategy, genetic algorithms have
ended up playing only a modest role as design
tools in science and engineering. We review
the reasons for this apparent failure, and we
suggest a more relaxed view of their utility.
1 INTRODUCTION
“Adaptive evolution is the motor of biology. But its
mechanisms are so general that they should be effec-
tive in shaping artificial systems as well!” This was the
manifesto John Holland read out at the beginning of
the 70’s. What many heard, or pretended to hear, was
a message with more haste and more hubris: “Biologi-
cal evolution works wonders. Let us apply its methods
to engineering and we’ll work wonders ourselves!”
Thus, the genetic algorithm (GA) soon found its way
in the engineer’s toolbox, to be employed as a ready-
to-use feedback loop for design optimization (Shaffer
1999); the problem-specific part is supplied through
a “fitness function”. This combination works much
like the generic operational amplifier loop used in sig-
nal synthesis, where the engineer only need drop in a
problem-specific feedback element.
In thirty years, genetic algorithms have grown in ex-
pertise and sophistication. They have secured for
themselves a place under the sun, but in spite of their
great promise they have not swept the engineering
world. Who should we complain with? And, then,
about what?
One may plead that today’s genetic algorithms do not
yet take advantage of the evolutionary paradigm’s full
range of possibilities (cf. Section 4); that more storage
and processing power are needed to do full justice to
the approach; that the software is still experimental
and cannot be readily used by the non-specialist. In
other words, that better performance is just a mat-
ter of time and patience (and, as usual, money). We
shall argue that the core issue is a different one. Ge-
netic algorithms are not on probation; they are already
doing well today. They make a superb tool for open-
ended exploration. They may save conceptual labor (if
not necessarily material resources) in local optimiza-
tion and dynamic tracking tasks. But they fall in line
with their competitors when it comes to tasks of delib-
erate, long-haul design—what is ordinarily meant by
engineering. Ours is not an empirical assessment: this
failure is owed to intrinsic factors. Namely, the very
premises that make adaptive mechanims work so well
in the wild no longer hold in the engineer’s studio.
2 DELIBERATE VS ACCIDENTAL
DESIGN
We shall first present the issue is in terms of delib-
erate vs accidental design.1 This view, though cor-
rect, is not fully satisfactory. It allows one to un-
derstand why genetic algorithms perform, under engi-
neering constraints, more poorly that one might hope,
but does not really explain why the performance gap
between this mode of operation and that of uncon-
strained evolution is so large. That will be done in
Section 5.
Evolution indeed produces wonderful objects, but, like
a stage magician, it is in the enviable position not to
have to state, ahead of time, what precisely the next
number will consist in. We may feel that, in designing
a cheetah, evolution had committed itself to optimiz-
ing for speed—the cheetah runs very fast indeed. But
the Darwininan “contract” did not explicitly mention
1We are not, of course, using ‘accidental’ in a disparag-
ing sense (Dawkins 1996).
speed; it only stipulated differential advantage; this
might have been achieved by stealth instead of speed,
or by a different metabolism. The genuine objective
function, “long-term inclusive fitness”, has many more
peaks to offer than the more restrictive objective func-
tion “speed”. Only a posteriori can one say that the
beautiful design which was delivered by evolution was
“for speed”: the next time we confront evolution with
a similar problem we may get a quite different solu-
tion. And if we actually insist on putting “speed” in
the contract specifications—as when we do selective
breeding—then we so much limit evolution’s options
that a beautiful design may not come out at all.
In sum, to expect that evolution will perform on de-
mand, on the shop floor, stunts as amazing as those it
performs in the wild is at the very least a form of statis-
tical fallacy! In fact, the less we insist that evolution
read our wish list, the better will it be able to sur-
prise us with lovely presents. Unfortunately, though a
resolve to be discreet in expressing one’s desires may
make a good recipe for a lasting friendship, it would
yield a frustrating relationship with any engineering
consulting firm: What is it precisely that we want from
them?
3 THE CANONICAL SCENARIO
Since the consolidation of the modern synthesis
(cf. Fisher 1930, Mayr 1963),2 evolutionary genetics
has been using as a standard “demonstration set”
the nucleus of the eukaryotic cell—with a well-defined
complement of chromosomes undergoing meiosis and
mitosis, mutation and crossover. Thus, the storage
and duplication of genetic data are kept in full view.
On the other hand, ontogenic development and inter-
action of the phenotype with its environment do not
explicitly appear on the scene; they are substituted
for by a narrator, the “fitness function”, which just
informs us of the drama’s final actuarial statistics—
how many births and deaths.
This is the canonical scenario that Holland (1975) gen-
eralized to artificial systems. By proceeding in this
way he automatically guaranteed that genetic algo-
rithms can work—since they include those of biol-
ogy. Moreover, the scenario comes with an already
2At least since 1868, we’ve had a plausible conceptual
mechanism for biological evolution, i.e., Darwin’s theory
of “descent with variation”; even though concrete imple-
mentation details were initially missing, the theory did not
depend much on them anyway. Nonetheless, Darwin’s the-
ory remained exactly that, that is, just a theory (and even
one that was not given particularly great attention to),
until the burgeoning of genetics.
well-developed body of theory connecting gene me-
chanics to population statistics via an arbitrary, exter-
nally given fitness function. Thus, a generic genetic-
algorithm “driver” can be piggybacked on any com-
binatorial optimization problem. All you have to do
is:
• (Genome) Represent a search-space point by the
string of its coordinates in some appropriate ref-
erence frame.
• (Population) Provide room for an adequately
large number of such strings.
• (Fitness) Evaluate the given fitness function on
each element of the population; use the result to
determine the relative size of its offspring.
• (Update step) Normalize (Hancock 1994), and
replace the old population with the new popula-
tion.
Note that the GA driver does not need to know,
for its proper functioning, what the genome “really
means”: the responsibility for that interpretation is
carried solely by the external fitness function. Thus,
in spite of their biological inspiration, genetic algo-
rithms have no handicap in dealing with problems of
a nonbiological nature.
Today, it is clear that the above scenario is only one
of many in which biological evolution can be found to
act; though routine performances are regularly shown
on that stage, the most gripping dramas of evolution
are played more rarely and in less publicised venues
(see Section 4). But, for the moment, let us stick with
the canonical scenario, and compare its uses by natural
evolution with those by the countless “applications”
reported in a host of proceedings (see, for instance,
Ba¨ck 1997, Fogarty 1994, Higuchi 1997, Porto 1998).
The most striking difference is how directly, in the
typical artificial-system application, the phenotype is
represented in the genotype. In a traveling-salesman
problem, the genotype may simply be an ordered list
of city coordinates (Valenzuela 1997); in a job shop
scheduling problem, it may be a list of the proposed
starting times for the jobs to be performed (Lin 1997);
in an airplane design, a list of the numerical design pa-
rameters to be varied (Rasheed 1997). Similarly, the
typical fitness function involves little more than met-
ric or constraint information directly derivable from
the genome (distance between cities, conflict between
jobs, etc.). The genetic algorithm is thus asked to per-
form a task that not only is clerical, but that cannot
in principle be eased by any higher-level engineering
insight—since the problem has no hidden structure to
be discovered. Other search approaches like breadth-
first or branch-and-bound may well give comparable
(and similarly unremarkable) results. In these cases,
the pedestrian performance of the genetic algorithm
directly reflects the pedestrian context in which it was
used.
Let us turn to the use of the canonical scenario for
more demanding applications. Ideally, we would like
the feedback loop from function to genome, as estab-
lished by the genetic algorithm, to “servo” a huge col-
lection of small clerical steps into an integrated en-
gineering feat involving many interlocking design as-
pects. After all, if the canonical scenario has allowed
nature to design the vertebrate eye, why shouldn’t it
allow a GA to design a camera, given its functional
specifications?
Imagine yourself trying to specify a fitness function
that, starting with a supply of assorted materials, will
yield the design of an optical camera. Your require-
ments are that
1. In combination with the generic GA driver, the
fitness function shall evolve the design for the
camera in a reasonably short time. This requires
that selective pressure be maintained at a sus-
tained level (and in the right direction) through-
out the whole process. For a complex object like a
camera (lens, shutter, light-tightness of the enclo-
sure, film transport) the only way to insure this
is for the fitness function to recognize possible
intermediate steps between the initial state and
the completed camera, and incrementally reward
these steps in an appropriate order.3
2. On the other hand, the evolving system should not
produce irrelevant or confusing items (Rasheed
1997), such as something that looks like a cam-
era but doesn’t quite work like one. In essence,
we want to avoid the paradox of the “universal
library” (Lasswitz 1901)—which contains all pos-
sible books and is therefore as useless as the empty
library! If the fitness function can tell only at the
last moment that the item produced after long la-
bor is not indeed a functional camera (and this
would indeed be the case if the fitness function
only contained the bare functional specifications),
then the puzzle has to be scrambled and started
all over again at every iteration.
3We have no qualms with arguments that individual
camera elements, such as a lens, can rapidly evolve from a
simple functional prescription (Nilsson 1994).
In theory, the fitness function only needs to know what
a camera should do. In practice, requirements 1 and
2 also ask this function to know what a camera might
look like and how it could be fabricated—but this is
at cross-purposes with the raison d’eˆtre of genetic al-
gorithms, namely, that
3. Designing the fitness function should require
much less knowledge and engineering effort than
directly designing the intended object in the first
place.
It is this third requirement that the less pedestrian
applications of genetic algorithms in the canonical sce-
nario tend to violate: a good design may come out, but
at the cost of a lot of problem-dependent knowledge
that one explicitly or implicitly supplied in order to
set up an effective search landscape.
4 WIDER SCENARIOS
Perhaps, one might argue, requirements 1 and 2 of
the previous section, rather than having to be explic-
itly distilled by the engineer into the fitness function,
could be automatically catered to by a more flexible
GA driver. Why should a GA be obliged to stick to the
canonical scenario when natural evolution is allowed to
run circles around it?
We barely need mention a host of possible vari-
ations on the mutation/crossover theme, such as
inversion, deletion, reduplication, non-homologous
crossover, dominance, polyploidy, etc., which are pro-
posed (though rarely used) in the GA literature. We
also need barely mention other external or internal
factors (genetic drift, extreme geographical segrega-
tion, geological catastrophes) which may momentar-
ily let one escape the tight control of the gener-
ate/select/regenerate loop. These are relatively trivial
enhancements to the canonical scenario, and may be
readily incorporated into it.
A more significant hint as to how genetic algorithms
could be enhanced is provided by the frequency with
which a symbiosis “operator” has intervened in the
major evolutionary inventions (Margulis 91). Among
the most familiar forms of symbiosis one may list the
intimate compact between two species, as exemplified
by lichens, the vital interdependence between individ-
uals of a bee colony, and the exacting social contract4
4For example, the blood’s red cells are asked to forfeit
reproduction (they don’t have a nucleus) for the sake of
gas transport efficiency, and sperms agree to leave behind
their mitochondria on entering the egg.
between the cells of a multicellular organism. In turn,
the “legal machinery” that makes this contract oper-
ative is embodied by a more subtle form of symbiosis,
that is, the complex relationship between genome and
soma (Dawkins 1990, Ridley 1995).
Less widely appreciated is the symbiosis between dif-
ferent bacteria, which, established early in the history
of life, soon gave rise to the eukaryotic cell (Margulis
1995). The establishment of a symbiosis is an inversion
of the mechanism which is central to so many artificial
intelligence models. Instead of a main goal recursively
generating a family of subgoals, here we have instead
a set of independently born goals that eventually and
accidentally accrete into a supergoal, and may do so
recursively. With reference to the discussion of the
previous section, when the fitness function of the su-
pergoal needs to be optimized, the symbionts have al-
ready been optimized according to their own fitness
functions—so that only fine tuning of the overall func-
tion is needed. Thus, one gets most of the benefits
of a variable or hierarchical fitness function without
the costs of having to design it (cf. Smith 1776); the
catch, of course, is that one has no idea where the
whole process is headed (Schmookler 1993).
To proceed even further on this theme, cultural evo-
lution, with novel reproductive mechanisms (Dawkins
1990), is superposed on ordinary genetic evolution and
maintains an intimate relationship with it (Plotkin
1993). Finally, sociality and culture come together
in large human organizations. Some of these organi-
zations may enjoy enough distinctness, permanence,
and specific reactivity to qualify as collective organ-
isms with an individuality of their own, opening up
still further evolutionary possibilities.5
On the artificial front, cellular automata and swarm
systems explore collective behavior at different levels
of aggregation. Synthetic evolutionary system such as
Tierra and its descendants (Ray 1994) have been quite
successful at inventing from scratch forms of collabora-
tion, antagonism, symbiosis, and parasitism. In fact,
no serious artificial life projects can do without provi-
sions for open-ended, hierarchical evolution.
Would genetic algorithms be more effective engineer-
ing tools if their repertoire included such extended
forms of evolution, or if, like Tierra, they were pro-
vided with the means to “roll their own”? In fact,
multi-level genetic algorithms are occasionally found.
Simulated annealing with “designer’s” temperature
5Note that a large fraction of today’s software engineer-
ing effort is aimed at providing these organization with a
“nervous system” of their own.
schedules provides a systematic way to designate a
particular aggregation level as the temporary focus of
evolutionary activity (Ingber 1992). Even more inte-
gration between levels is envisioned by Sanchez (1997).
However, it is doubtful that such measures, drastic as
they are, could make much of a difference with respect
to the issue discussed here, namely, the performance
gap between the exploratory and the engineering mode
of genetic algorithms, as I’ll explain in the next sec-
tion.
5 ON A RACE WITH ONESELF
With a fixed fitness function, genetic algorithms can
only do so much—but, if Holland’s arguments about
the equivalence between natural and artificial adapta-
tion are correct, this must also be the case for natural
evolution. In fact, hardly ever does one catch the lat-
ter doing other than routine maintenance and minor
parameter tracking: the average duration of a species
is a few million years, and during this time the pheno-
type hardly shows any changes (Eldredge and Gould
1972).
As we saw in Section 3, if one were allowed to put into
the fitness function a sequence of incrementally graded
intermediate goals (“If in state S1 please evolve to S2;
if in S2, try to get to S3;” and so forth), or, equiv-
alently, if one were allowed to use a variable fitness
function that swept through those states, then engi-
neering design via a GA would be a breeze. But point 3
stipulated that the fitness function should, in essence,
consist of no more that the functional specifications.6
In other words, since in the engineering design mode
the target is fixed—by contract, as it were—and the
fitness function encodes the target in a fixed way, then
it is in the very nature of this design mode that the
fitness function itself should be fixed.
In natural adaptation, however, the fitness function
does not stay fixed all the time. If the environment
goes through significant alterations, so does the fitness
function. Here we distinguish three cases.
1. If environmental changes take place very slowly,
then species easily adjust to them; but, precisely
because the changes are so small, no evolutionary
feats of great consequence may be expected. In
6Consider the indicator function—which returns a 1 if
the design meets the functional specifications and 0 other-
wise. The typical fitness function is just a smoothed-out
version of the indicator function. In principle, any “mas-
saging” of the indicator function is allowed, but the mas-
saging rule should be part and parcel of the GA package,
not a problem-dependent transformation.
this case, the achievements of natural evolution
certainly do not threaten the engineering studio’s
pride.
2. If the change is sudden and large, then natural
adaptation is unable to respond and extinction
occurs. Again, nothing here for evolution to brag
about.
3. If the rate of change of the environment is large
but still within the tracking range of the adaptive
mechanism, then indeed evolution will proceed at
a fast rate. But how often will environmental
change happen to meet these requirements? If it
slows down, we go back to case 1. If it speeds up,
we fall into case 2. If it goes back-and-forth, the
instantaneous rate of evolution will—it is true—
be proportional to that of these changes, but the
long-term rate will only be proportional to its
square root—since we have a diffusive process.
Thus, one might conclude that the long-term average
of a natural system’s evolution rate will never amount
to much. But this conclusion is spoiled by a special sit-
uation that occurs within case 3, and which is conceiv-
ably responsible for the bulk of evolutionary change.
This is when the significant environment of an individ-
ual is represented not only by an unresponsive geolog-
ical/astronomical background, but also by the other
individuals of the same species and by a few other
species that tightly interact with it. In these circum-
stances, as soon as a species changes so does its fitness
function, creating an immediate feedback. The posi-
tive component of this feedback may put the species
in a sustained race with itself: As soon as a tree dis-
covers how to get taller than the others and capture
more sunlight, its success, i.e., enhanced reproduction,
makes the whole population taller; then, to stay ahead,
a tree has to get even taller.
Since here the bar is raised by the organism itself, not
by external, unrelated forces, there is no risk that it
will be raised too high too soon, as in case 2 above.
That is, positive feedback is automatically limited by
a negative feedback component that adjust the rate of
change of a species, seen as environment, to that sus-
tainable by the species seen as an adaptive system: If a
crab’s claws become too successful at crushing oysters,
and thus at acquiring food, then oysters disappears
fast and the crab becomes by the same token less suc-
cessful at finding food; in this sense, claw strength is
self-limiting.
Such a controlled arms race is precisely the regime
where evolution runs close to its maximum possible
speed (Stanley 1981, Ridley 1995). Even relatively
brief spells of it can drastically raise the overall long-
term rate (since, as we’ve seen, evolution’s background
rate is close to zero). We may call this kind of design
accidental, but we have to acknowledge it is incom-
parably faster than the typical deliberate, fixed-target
design characteristic of the engineering mode.
6 CONCLUSIONS
The evolutionary performance of natural life may con-
stitute a reasonable benchmark for artificial life, but
is not a meaningful term of comparison for genetic al-
gorithms as used in the design engineer’s studio. A
studio is asked to produce designs on contract; evo-
lution volunteers, when and where it pleases, objects
of its own choice that “look as” they were designed—
what Dawkins (1996) calls designoids.
We pay the engineering studio not for the information
its product contains, but for the correlation that the
design process guarantees between the product and our
stated needs (cf. Plotkin 1993, Adami 1996).7 Genetic
algorithms shouldn’t feel slighted if the engineer, hav-
ing to give these needs immediate priority, is forced
to use a powerful tool in a much more conservative
fashion than natural evolution.
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